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ABSTRACT
Privacy is an increasingly important aspect of data publishing. Rea-
soning about privacy, however, is fraught with pitfalls. One of
the most significant is the auxiliary information (also called exter-
nal knowledge, background knowledge, or side information) that
an adversary gleans from other channels such as the web, public
records, or domain knowledge. This paper explores how one can
reason about privacy in the face of rich, realistic sources of auxil-
iary information. Specifically, we investigate the effectiveness of
current anonymization schemes in preserving privacy when mul-
tiple organizations independently release anonymized data about
overlapping populations.
1. We investigate composition attacks, in which an adversary uses
independent anonymized releases to breach privacy. We explain
why recently proposed models of limited auxiliary information
fail to capture composition attacks. Our experiments demon-
strate that even a simple instance of a composition attack can
breach privacy in practice, for a large class of currently pro-
posed techniques. The class includes k-anonymity and several
recent variants.
2. On a more positive note, certain randomization-based notions
of privacy (such as differential privacy) provably resist compo-
sition attacks and, in fact, the use of arbitrary side information.
This resistance enables “stand-alone” design of anonymization
schemes, without the need for explicitly keeping track of other
releases. We provide a precise formulation of this property, and
prove that an important class of relaxations of differential pri-
vacy also satisfy the property. This significantly enlarges the
class of protocols known to enable modular design.
1. INTRODUCTION
Privacy is an increasingly important aspect of data publishing.
The potential social benefits of analyzing large collections of per-
sonal information (census data, medical records, social networks)
are significant. At the same time, the release of information from
such repositories can be devastating to the privacy of individuals or
organizations [5]. The challenge is therefore to discover and release
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the global characteristics of these databases without compromising
the privacy of the individuals whose data they contain.
Reasoning about privacy, however, is fraught with pitfalls. One
of the most significant difficulties is the auxiliary information (also
called external knowledge, background knowledge, or side infor-
mation) that an adversary gleans from other channels such as the
web or public records. For example, simply removing obviously
identifying information such as names and address does not suf-
fice to protect privacy since the remaining information (such as
zip code, gender and date of birth [30]) may still identify a per-
son uniquely when combined with auxiliary information (such as
voter registration records). Schemes that resist such linkage have
been the focus of extensive investigation, starting with work on
publishing contingency tables [1], and more recently, in a line of
techniques based on “k-anonymity” [30].
This paper explores how one can reason about privacy in the
face of rich, realistic sources of auxiliary information. This fol-
lows lines of work in both the data mining [26, 27, 9] and cryp-
tography [10, 12] communities that have sought principled ways
to incorporate unknown auxiliary information into anonymization
schemes. Specifically, we investigate the effectiveness of current
anonymization schemes in preserving privacy when multiple or-
ganizations independently release anonymized data about overlap-
ping populations. We show new attacks on some schemes and also
deepen the current understanding of schemes known to resist such
attacks. Our results and their relation to previous work are dis-
cussed below.
Schemes that retain privacy guarantees in the presence of inde-
pendent releases are said to compose securely. The terminology,
borrowed from cryptography (which borrowed, in turn, from soft-
ware engineering), stems from the fact that schemes which com-
pose securely can be designed in a stand-alone fashion without
explicitly taking other releases into account. Thus, understanding
independent releases is essential for enabling modular design. In
fact, one would like schemes that compose securely not only with
independent instances of themselves, but with arbitrary external
knowledge. We discuss both types of compositions in this paper.
The dual problem to designing schemes with good composition
properties is the design of attacks that exploit such information. We
call these composition attacks.A simple example of such an attack,
in which two hospitals with overlapping patient populations pub-
lish anonymized medical data, is presented below. Composition
attacks highlight a realistic and important class of vulnerabilities.
As privacy preserving data publishing becomes more commonly
deployed, it is increasingly difficult to keep track of all the organi-
zations that publish anonymized summaries involving a given in-
dividual or entity and schemes that are vulnerable to composition
attacks will become increasingly difficult to use safely.
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1.1 Contributions
Our contributions are summarized briefly in the abstract, above,
and discussed in more detail in the following subsections.
1.1.1 Composition Attacks on Partition-based Schemes
We introduce composition attacks and study their effect on a
popular class of partitioning-based anonymization schemes. Very
roughly, computer scientists have worked on two broad classes of
anonymization techniques. Randomization-based schemes intro-
duce uncertainty either by randomly perturbing the raw data (a
technique called input perturbation, randomized response, e.g., [34,
2, 16]), or post-randomization, e.g., [32]), or by injecting random-
ness into the algorithm used to analyze the data (e.g., [6, 28]).
Partition-based schemes cluster the individuals in the database into
disjoint groups satisfying certain criteria (for example, in k-anony-
mity [30], each group must have size at least k). For each group,
certain exact statistics are calculated and published. Partition-based
schemes include k-anonymity [30] as well as several recent vari-
ants, e.g., [26, 23, 36, 27, 9].
Because they release exact information, partition-based schemes
seem especially vulnerable to composition attacks. In the first part
of this paper we study a simple instance of a composition attack
called an intersection attack. We observe that the specific proper-
ties of current anonymization schemes make this attack possible,
and we evaluate its success empirically.
Example. Suppose two hospitals H1 and H2 in the same city re-
lease anonymized patient-discharge information. Because they are
in the same city, some patients may visit both hospitals with sim-
ilar ailments. Tables 1(a) and 1(b) represent (hypothetical) inde-
pendent k-anonymizations of the discharge data from H1 and H2
using k = 4 and k = 6, respectively. The sensitive attribute here
is the patient’s medical condition. It is left untouched. The other
attributes, deemed non-sensitive, are generalized (that is, replaced
with aggregate values), so that within each group of rows, the vec-
tors if non-sensitive attributes are identical. If Alice’s employer
knows that she is 28 years old, lives in zip code 13012 and re-
cently visited both hospitals, then he can attempt to locate her in
both anonymized tables. Alice matches four potential records in
H1’s data, and six potential records in H2’s. However, the only
disease that appears in both matching lists is AIDS, and so Alice’s
employer learns the reason for her visit.
Intersection Attacks. The above example relies on two proper-
ties of the partition-based anonymization schemes: (i) Exact sensi-
tive value disclosure: the “sensitive” value corresponding to each
member of the group is published exactly; and (ii) Locatability:
given any individual’s non-sensitive values (non-sensitive values
are exactly those that are assumed to be obtainable from other, pub-
lic information sources) one can locate the group in which individ-
ual has been put in. Based on these properties, an adversary can
narrow down the set of possible sensitive values for an individual
by intersecting the sets of sensitive values present in his/her groups
from multiple anonymized releases.
Properties (i) and (ii) turn out to be widespread. The exact dis-
closure of sensitive value lists is a design feature common to all
the schemes based on k-anonymity: preserving the exact distribu-
tion of sensitive values is important, and so no recoding is usually
applied. Locatability is less universal, since it depends on the ex-
act choice of clustering algorithm (used to form groups) and the
recoding applied to the non-sensitive attributes. However, some
schemes always satisfy locatability by virtue of their structure (e.g.,
schemes that recursively partition the data set along the lines of a
hierarchy that is subsequently used for generalization [21, 22]). For
Non-Sensitive Sensitive
Zip code Age Nationality Condition
1 130** <30 * AIDS
2 130** <30 * Heart Disease
3 130** <30 * Viral Infection
4 130** <30 * Viral Infection
5 130** ≥40 * Cancer
6 130** ≥40 * Heart Disease
7 130** ≥40 * Viral Infection
8 130** ≥40 * Viral Infection
9 130** 3* * Cancer
10 130** 3* * Cancer
11 130** 3* * Cancer
12 130** 3* * Cancer
(a)
Non-Sensitive Sensitive
Zip code Age Nationality Condition
1 130** <35 * AIDS
2 130** <35 * Tuberculosis
3 130** <35 * Flu
4 130** <35 * Tuberculosis
5 130** <35 * Cancer
6 130** <35 * Cancer
7 130** ≥35 * Cancer
8 130** ≥35 * Cancer
9 130** ≥35 * Cancer
10 130** ≥35 * Tuberculosis
11 130** ≥35 * Viral Infection
12 130** ≥35 * Viral Infection
(b)
Table 1: A simple example of a composition attack. Tables (a) and (b) are 4-
anonymous (respectively, 6-anonymous) patient data from two hypothetical
hospitals. If an Alice’s employer knows that she is 28, lives in zip code
13012 and visits both hospitals, he learns that she has AIDS.
other schemes, locatability is not perfect but our experiments sug-
gest that using simple heuristics one can locate a individual’s group
with high probability.
Even with these properties, it is difficult to come up with a theo-
retical model for intersection attacks because the partitioning tech-
niques generally create dependencies that are hard to model an-
alytically. However, if the sensitive values of the members of a
group could be assumed to be statistically independent of their
non-sensitive attribute values, then a simple birthday-paradox-style
analysis would yield reasonable bounds.
Experimental Results. Instead, we evaluated the success of in-
tersection attacks empirically. We ran the intersection attack on
two popular census databases anonymized using partition-based
schemes. We evaluated the severity of such an attack by mea-
suring the number of individuals who had their sensitive value re-
vealed. Our experimental results confirm that partitioning-based
anonymization schemes including k-anonymity and its recent vari-
ants, `-diversity and t-closeness, are indeed vulnerable to intersec-
tion attacks. Section 3 elaborates our methodology and results.
Related Work on Modeling Background Knowledge. It is im-
portant to point out that the partition-based schemes in the litera-
ture were not designed to be used in contexts where independent
releases are available. Thus, we do not view our results as pointing
out a flaw in these schemes, but rather as directing the community’s
attention to an important direction for future work.
It is equally important to highlight the progress that has already
been made on modeling sophisticated background knowledge in
partition-based schemes. One line has focused on taking into ac-
count other, known releases, such as previous publications by the
same organization (“sequential” releases, [33, 7, 36]) and multiple
views of the same data set [37]. Another line has considered incor-
porating knowledge of the clustering algorithm used to group indi-
viduals [35]. Most relevant to this paper are works that have sought
to model unknown background knowledge. Martin et al. [27] and
Chen et al. [9] provide complexity measures for an adversary’s side
information (roughly, they measure the size of the smallest formula
within a CNF-like class that can encode the side information). Both
works design schemes that provably resist attacks based on side in-
formation whose complexity is below a given threshold.
Independent releases (and hence composition attacks) fall out-
side the models proposed by these works. The sequential release
models do not fit because they deal assume the other releases are
known to the anonymization algorithm. The complexity-based mea-
sures do not fit because independent releases appear to have com-
plexity that is linear in the size of the data set.
1.1.2 Composing Randomization-based Schemes
Composition attacks appear to be difficult to reason about, and it
is not initially clear whether it is possible at all to design schemes
that resist such attacks. Even defining composition properties pre-
cisely is tricky in the presence of malicious behavior (for example,
see [24] for a recent survey about composability of cryptographic
protocols). Nevertheless, a significant family of anonymization
definitions do provide guarantees against composition attacks, namely
schemes that satisfy differential privacy [14]. Recent work has
greatly expanded the applicability of differential privacy and its re-
laxations, both in the theoretical [15, 6, 14, 4, 28] and applied [17,
3, 25] literature. However, certain recently developed techniques
such as sampling [8], instance-based noise addition [29] and data
synthesis [25] appear to require relaxations of the definition.
It is simple to prove that both the strict and relaxed variants of
differential privacy compose well (see [13, 29, 28]). Less triv-
ially, however, one can prove that strictly differentially-private al-
gorithms also provide meaningful privacy in the presence of ar-
bitrary side information (Dwork and McSherry, [12]). In partic-
ular, these schemes compose well even with completely different
anonymization schemes.
It is natural to ask if there are weaker definitions which provide
similar guarantees. Certainly not all of them do: one natural re-
laxation of differential privacy, which replaces the multiplicative
distance used in differential privacy with total variation distance,
fails completely to protect privacy (see example 2 in [14]).
In this paper, we prove that two important relaxations of differ-
ential privacy do, indeed, resist arbitrary side information. First,
we provide a Bayesian formulation of differential privacy which
makes its resistance to arbitrary side information explicit. Second,
we prove that the relaxed definitions of [13, 25] still imply the
Bayesian formulation. The proof is non-trivial, and relies on the
“continuity” of Bayes’ rule with respect to certain distance mea-
sures on probability distributions. Our result means that the re-
cent techniques mentioned above [13, 8, 29, 25] can be used mod-
ularly with the same sort of assurances as in the case of strictly
differentially-private algorithms.
2. PARTITION-BASED SCHEMES
Let D be a multiset of tuples where each tuple corresponds to
an individual in the database. Let R be an anonymized version
of D. From this point on, we use the terms tuple and individual
interchangeably, unless the context leads to ambiguity. Let A =
A1, A2, . . . , Ar be a collection of attributes and t be a tuple in R;
we use the notation t[A] to denote (t[A1], . . . , t[Ar]) where each
t[Ai] denotes the value of attribute Ai in table R for t.
In partitioning-based anonymization approaches, there exists a
division of data attributes into two classes, sensitive attributes and
non-sensitive attributes. A sensitive attribute is one whose value
and an individual’s association with that value should not be dis-
closed. All attributes other than the sensitive attributes are non-
sensitive attributes.
DEFINITION 1 (QUASI-IDENTIFIER). A set of non-sensitive
attributes {Q1, . . . , Qr} is called a quasi-identifier if there is at
least one individual in the original sensitive database D who can
be uniquely identified by linking these attributes with auxiliary data.
Previous work in this line typically assumed that all the attributes
in the database other than the sensitive attribute form the quasi-
identifier.
DEFINITION 2 (EQUIVALENCE CLASS). An equivalence cla-
ss for a tableR with respect to attributes inA is the set of all tuples
t1, t2, . . . , ti ∈ R for which the projection of each tuple onto at-
tributes in A is the same, i.e., t1[A] = t2[A] . . . = ti[A].
Partition-based schemes cluster individuals into groups, and then
recode (i.e., generalize or change) the non-sensitive values so that
each group forms an equivalence class with respect to the quasi-
identifiers. Sensitive values are not recoded. Different criteria are
used to decide how, exactly, the groups should be structured. The
most common rule is k-anonymity, which requires that each equiv-
alence class contain at least k individuals.
DEFINITION 3 (k-ANONYMITY). A release R is k-anonym-
ous if for every tuple t ∈ R, there exist at least k − 1 other tuples
t1, t2, . . . , tk−1 ∈ R such that t[A] = t1[A] = . . . = tk−1[A] for
every collection A of attributes in quasi-identifier.
In our experiments we also consider two extensions to k-anonymity.
DEFINITION 4 (ENTROPY `-DIVERSITY). For an equivalence
class E, let S denote the domain of the sensitive attributes, and
p(E, s) is the fraction of records in E that have sensitive value s,
then E is `-diverse if:
−
X
s∈S
p(E, s) log(p(E, s)) ≥ log l .
A table is `-diverse if all its equivalence classes are `-diverse.
DEFINITION 5 (t-CLOSENESS). An equivalence class E is t-
close if the distance between the distribution of a sensitive attribute
in this class and distribution of the attribute in the whole table is
no more than a threshold t. A table is t-close if all its equivalence
classes are t-close.
Locatability. As mentioned in the introduction, many anonymiza-
tion algorithms satisfy locatability, that is, they output tables in
which one can locate an individual’s group based only on his or her
non-sensitive values.
DEFINITION 6 (LOCATABILITY). Let Q be the set of quasi-
identifier values of an individual in the original databaseD. Given
the k-anonymized release R of D, the locatability property allows
an adversary to identify the set of tuples {t1, . . . , tK} in R (where
K ≥ k) that correspond to Q.
Locatability does not necessarily hold for all partition-based sche-
mes, since it depends on the exact choice of clustering algorithm
(used to form groups) and the recoding applied to the non-sensitive
attributes. However it is widespread. Some schemes always satisfy
locatability by virtue of their structure (e.g., schemes that recur-
sively partition the data set along the lines of a hierarchy always
provide locatability if the attributes are then generalized using the
same hierarchy, or if (min,max) summaries are used [21, 22]). For
other schemes, locatability is not perfect but our experiments sug-
gest that using simple heuristics can locate a person’s group with
good probability. For example, microaggregation [11] clusters indi-
viduals based on Euclidean distance. The vectors of non-sensitive
values in each group are replaced by the centroid (i.e., average)
of the vectors. The simplest heuristic for locating an individual’s
group is to choose the group with the closest centroid vector. In
experiments on census data, this correctly located approximately
70% of individuals. In our attacks, we always assume locatability.
This assumption was also made in previous studies [30, 27].
2.1 Intersection Attack
Armed with these basic definitions, we now proceed to formalize
the intersection attack (Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 Intersection attack
1: R1, . . . , Rn ← n independent anonymized releases
2: P ← set of overlapping population
3: for each individual i in P do
4: for j = 1 to n do
5: eij ← Get equivalence class(Rj , i)
6: sij ← Sensitive value set(eij)
7: end for
8: Si ← si1 ∩ si2 ∩ . . . ∩ sin
9: end forRETURN S1, . . . , S|P |
LetR1, . . . , Rn be n independent anonymized releases with min-
imum partition-sizes of k1, . . . , kn, respectively. Let P be the
overlapping population occurring in all the releases. The function
Get equivalence class returns the equivalence class into which an
individual falls in a given anonymized release. The function Sen-
sitive value set returns the set of (distinct) sensitive values for the
members in a given equivalence class.
DEFINITION 7 (ANONYMITY). For each individual i in P ,
the anonymity factor promised by each release Rj is equal to the
corresponding minimum partition-size kj .
However, as pointed out in [26], the actual anonymity offered is
less than this ideal value and is equal to number of distinct values
in each equivalence class. We call this as the effective anonymity
DEFINITION 8 (EFFECTIVE ANONYMITY). For an individual
i in P , the effective anonymity offered by a release Rj is equal to
the number of distinct sensitive values of the partition into which
the individual falls into. Let eij be the equivalence class or parti-
tion into which i falls into with respect to the release Rj , and let
sij denote the sensitive value set for eij . The effective anonymity
for i with respect to the release Rj is: EAij = |sij | .
For each target individual i,EAij is the effective prior anonymity
with respect toRj (anonymity before the intersection attack). In the
intersection attack, the list of possible sensitive values associated
to the target is equal to intersection of all sensitive value sets sij ,
j = 1, . . . , n. So the effective posterior anonymity (cEAi) for i is:cEAi = |{∩sij}|, j = 1, . . . , n .
The difference between the effective prior anonymity and effec-
tive posterior anonymity quantifies the drop in effective anonymity.
Anon Dropi = min
j=1,...,n
{EAij} − cEAi .
The vulnerable population (VP ) is the number of individuals
(among the overlapping population) for whom the intersection at-
tack leads to a positive drop in the effective anonymity.
VP = {i ∈ P : Anon Dropi > 0} .
After performing the sensitive value set intersection, the adver-
sary knows only a possible set of values that each individual’s sen-
sitive attribute can take. So, the adversary deduces that with equal
probability (under the assumption that the adversary does not have
any further auxiliary information) the individual’s actual sensitive
value is one of the values in the set {∩sij} , j = 1, . . . , n. So, the
adversaries confidence level for an individual i can be defined as:
DEFINITION 9 (CONFIDENCE LEVEL Ci). For each individ-
ual i, the confidence level Ci of the adversary in identifying the
individual’s true sensitive value through the intersection attack is
defined as Ci = 1dEAi .
Now, given some confidence level C, we denote by VPC and
PVPC the set and the percentage of overlapping individuals for
whom the adversary can deduce the sensitive attribute value with a
confidence level of at least C.
VPC = {i ∈ P : Ci ≥ C} ,
PVPC =
|VPC |·100
|P | .
3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we describe our experimental study1. The pri-
mary goal is to quantify the severity of such an attack on exist-
ing schemes. Although the earlier works address problems with k-
anonymization and adversarial background knowledge, to the best
of our knowledge, none of these studies deal with attacks result-
ing from auxiliary independent releases. Furthermore, none of the
studies so far have quantified the severity of such an attack.
3.1 Setup
We use three different partitioning-based anonymization tech-
niques to demonstrate the intersection attack: k-anonymity, `-diver-
sity, and t-closeness. For k-anonymity, we use the Mondrian mul-
tidimensional approach proposed in [21] and the microaggregation
technique proposed in [11]. For `-diversity and t-closeness, we
use the definitions of entropy `-diversity and t-closeness proposed
in [26] and [23], respectively.
We use two census-based databases from the UCI Machine Learn-
ing repository [31]. The first one is the Adult database that has been
used extensively in the k-anonymity based studies. The database
was prepared in a similar manner to previous studies [21, 26] (also
explained in Table 2). The resulting database contained individual
records corresponding to 30162 people. The second database is
the IPUMS database that contains individual information from the
1997 census studies. We only use a subset of the attributes that are
similar to the attributes present in the Adult database to maintain
uniformity and to maintain quasi-identifiers. The IPUMS database
contains individual records corresponding to a total of 70187 peo-
ple. This data set was prepared as explained in Table 3.
From both Adult and IPUMS databases, we generate two over-
lapping subsets (Subset 1 and Subset 2) by randomly sampling in-
dividuals without replacement from the total population. We fixed
the overlap size to P = 5000. For each of the databases, the two
subsets are anonymized independently and the intersection attack
1The code, parameter settings, and complete results are made avail-
able at: http://www.cse.psu.edu/˜ranjit/kdd08.
Attribute Domain Size Class
Age 74 Quasi ID
Work Class 7 Quasi ID
Education 16 Quasi ID
Marital Status 7 Quasi ID
Race 5 Quasi ID
Gender 2 Quasi ID
Native Country 41 Quasi ID
Occupation 14 Sensitive
Table 2: Description of the Adult census database.
Attribute Domain Size Class
Age 100 Quasi ID
Work Class 5 Quasi ID
Education 10 Quasi ID
Marital Status 6 Quasi ID
Race 7 Quasi ID
Sex 2 Quasi ID
Birth Place 113 Quasi ID
Occupation 247 Sensitive
Table 3: Description of the IPUMS census database.
is run on the anonymization results. All the experiments were run
on a Pentium 4 system running Windows XP with 1GB RAM.
3.2 Severity of the Attack
Our first goal is to quantify the extent of damage possible through
the intersection attack. For this, we consider two possible situa-
tions: (i) Perfect breach and (ii) Partial breach.
3.2.1 Perfect Breach
A perfect breach occurs when the adversary can deduce the exact
sensitive value of an individual. In other words, a perfect breach
is when the adversary has a confidence level of 100% about the
individual’s sensitive data. To estimate the probability of a perfect
breach, we compute the percentage of overlapping population for
whom the intersection attack leads to a final sensitive value set of
size 1. Figure 1 plots this result.
We consider three scenarios for anonymizing the two overlap-
ping subsets: (i) Mondrian on both the data subsets, (ii) Microag-
gregation on both the data subsets, and (iii) Mondrian on the first
subset and microaggregation on the second subset. (k1, k2) repre-
sents the pair of k values used to anonymize the first and the second
subset, respectively. In the experiments, we use the same k values
for both the subsets (k1 = k2). Note that for simplicity, from now
on we will be defining confidence level in terms of percentages.
In the case of Adult database we found that around 12% of the
population is vulnerable to a perfect breach for k1 = k2 = 5. For
the IPUMS database, this value is much more severe around 60%.
As the degree of anonymization increases or in other words, as the
value of k increases, the percentage of vulnerable population goes
down. The reason for that is that as the value of k increases, the
partition sizes in each subset increases. This leads to a larger inter-
section set and thus lesser probability of obtaining an intersection
set of size 1.
3.2.2 Partial Breach
Our next experiment aims to compute a more practical quan-
tification of the severity of the intersection attack. In most cases,
to inflict a privacy breach, all that the adversary needs to do is to
boil down the possible sensitive values to a few values which it-
self could reveal a lot of information. For example, for a hospi-
tal discharge database, by boiling down the sensitive values of the
disease/diagnosis to a few values, say, “Flu”, “Fever”, or “Cold”,
it could be concluded that the individual is suffering from a viral
infection. In this case, the adversary’s confidence level is 1/3 =
33%. Figure 2 plots the percentage of vulnerable population for
whom the intersection attack leads to a partial breach for the Adult
and IPUMS databases.
Here, we only use the first anonymization scenario described
earlier in which both the overlapping subsets of the database are
anonymized using Mondrian multidimensional technique. Observe
that the severity of the attack increases alarmingly for slight relax-
ation on the required confidence level. For example, in the case
of IPUMS database, around 95% of the population was vulnerable
for a confidence level of 25% for k1 = k2 = 5. For the Adult
database, although this value is not as alarming, more than 60% of
the population was affected.
3.3 Drop in Anonymity
Our next goal is to measure the drop in anonymity occurring
due to the intersection attack.To achieve this, we first take a closer
look at the way these schemes work. As described in the earlier
sections, the basic paradigm in partitioning-based anonymization
schemes is to partition the data such that each partition size is at
least k. The methodology behind partitioning and then summariz-
ing varies from scheme to scheme. The minimum partition-size
(k) is thus used as a measure of the anonymity offered by these
solutions. However, the effective (or true) anonymity supported by
these solutions is far less than the presumed anonymity k (refer to
the discussion in Section 2.1).
Figure 3 plots the average partition sizes and the average effec-
tive anonymities for the overlapping population. Here again, we
only consider the scenario where both the overlapping subsets are
anonymized using Mondrian multidimensional technique. Observe
that the effective anonymity is much less than the partition size for
both the data subsets. Also, note that these techniques result in
partition sizes that are much larger than the minimum required of
k. For example, the average partition size observed in the IPUMS
database for k = 5 is close to 40. To satisfy the k-anonymity def-
inition, there is no need for any partition to be larger than 2k + 1.
The reasoning for this is straightforward as splitting the partition
of size greater than 2k + 1 into two we get partitions of size at
least k. Additionally, splitting any partition of size 2k + 1 or more
only results in preserving more information. The culprit behind
the larger average partition sizes is generalization based on user-
defined hierarchies. Since generalization-based partitioning cannot
be controlled at finer levels, the resulting partition sizes tend to be
much larger than the minimum required value.
For each individual in the overlapping population, the effective
prior anonymity is equal to the effective anonymity. We define
the average effective prior anonymity with respect to a release as
effective prior anonymities averaged over the individuals in the
overlapping population. Similarly, the average effective posterior
anonymity is the effective posterior anonymities averaged over the
individuals in the overlapping population. The difference between
the average effective prior anonymity and average effective poste-
rior anonymity gives the average drop in effective anonymity occur-
ring due to the intersection attack. Figure 4 plots the average effec-
tive prior anonymities and the average effective posterior anonymi-
ties for the overlapping population. Observe that the average ef-
fective posterior anonymity is much less than the average effective
prior anonymity for both subsets. Also note that we measure drop
in anonymities by using effective anonymities instead of presumed
anonymities. The situation only gets worse (drops get larger) when
presumed anonymities are used.
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Figure 1: Severity of the intersection attack - perfect breach (a) Adult database (b) IPUMS database.
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Figure 2: Severity of the intersection attack - partial breach (a) Adult database (b) IPUMS database.
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Figure 3: Comparison of presumed anonymity, actual partition sizes, and effective anonymity (a) Adult database (b) IPUMS database.
3.4 `-diversity and t-closeness
We now consider the `-diversity and t-closeness extensions to
the original k-anonymity definition. The goal again is to quantify
the severity of the intersection attack by measuring the extent to
which a partial breach occurs with varying levels of adversary con-
fidence levels. Figure 5 plots the percentage of vulnerable popula-
tion for whom the intersection attack leads to a partial breach for
the Adult and IPUMS databases. Here, we anonymize both the sub-
sets of the database with the same definition of privacy. We use the
mondrian multidimensional k-anonymity with the additional con-
straints as defined by `-diversity and t-closeness. Figure 5(a) plots
the result for the `-diversity using the same ` value for both the
subsets (`1 = `2) and with k = 10. Figure 5(b) plots the same for
t-closeness. Even though these extended definitions seem to per-
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Figure 4: Average drop in effective anonymity due to the intersection attack (a) Adult database (b) IPUMS database.
form better than the original k-anonymity definition, they still lead
to considerable breach in case of an intersection attack. This result
is fairly intuitive in the case of `-diversity. Consider the definition
of `-diversity: the sensitive value set corresponding to each parti-
tion should be “well” (`) diverse. However, there is no guarantee
that the intersection of two well diverse sets leads to a well diverse
set. t-closeness fares similarly. Also, both these definitions tend to
force larger partition sizes, thus resulting in heavy information loss.
Figure 6 plots the average partition sizes of the individuals corre-
sponding to the overlapping population. It compares the partition
sizes observed for k-anonymity, `-diversity, and t-closeness. For
the IPUMS database, with a value of k = 10, k-anonymity pro-
duces partitions with an average partition size of 45. While, for the
same value of k = 10, with a value of l = 5, the average partition
size obtained was close to 450. The partition sizes for t-closeness
get even worse, where a combination of k = 10 and t = 0.4 yield
partitions of average size close to 1300. We can observe similar
results for the Adult database.
3.5 Role of Sensitive Attribute Domain
In all of the above experiments we use the “Occupation” (oc-
cupation code of the individual) as the sensitive attribute for both
Adult and IPUMS databases as shown in Tables 2 and 3. The do-
main size of the Occupation attribute in the Adult database was 14
whereas, the domain size in the IPUMS database was 247. One
of the plausible reasons for the attack to be more severe in case
of the IPUMS database was the size of the sensitive attribute do-
main. This is because most of partition sizes are way larger than
the minimum value required i.e. k, in case of the Adult database, it
is possible that the sensitive value set corresponding to every par-
tition contains all the possible values in the domain. This implies
that an intersection of two sensitive value sets results in a set of size
close to the size of the domain. Thus, it is possible that intersection
attack will be less effective in cases where the sensitive attribute
domain size is less than the average partition size. Intuitively, it
seems like that in cases where the sensitive attribute domain size
is large (of the order of several hundreds) the intersection attack
would be more severe. Also, most real-life databases have sensi-
tive attributes with large domain sizes. For example, if we consider
a typical hospital discharge database, an ICD9 code is used to de-
scribe the diagnosis given to the patient. The possible values for
this code is a number from 1 to 999 [19] indicating the code for
the specific patient diagnosis. In other cases, the sensitive attribute
domain sizes tend be larger than this. The conjecture is that as the
Sensitive Attribute Domain Size Diversity
Occupation 247 4.30
Industry 145 4.35
Income 471 5.56
Table 4: IPUMS database versions (Non-Sensitive attributes remain same
as the original)
number of possible sensitive values increases, the intersection of
two different sets results in a less diverse set.
In order to confirm this, we constructed two new versions of the
IPUMS database by replacing the sensitive attribute “Occupation”
of each individual with “Industry” corresponding to the individual’s
work and “Income” corresponding to the total income of the indi-
vidual. The domain sizes corresponding to these attributes is sum-
marized in Table 4. The domain size for “Industry” attribute is 145,
for the original “Occupation” attribute si 247 and that of “Income”
is 471. Table 4 summarizes this. We ran the intersection attack on
these new versions of the IPUMS database and compared it with the
original. Figure 7 plots the average drop in effective anonymity for
the overlapping population. Based on our conjecture, the drop in ef-
fective anonymity should increase with the increase in the sensitive
attribute domain size. Surprisingly we did not observe the trend we
were expecting. The drop in effective anonymity in case of “Occu-
pation” was less than when compared with “Industry”. It turns out
that the reason for this is that the actual number of possible values
for each sensitive attribute does not necessarily be the same as the
domain size, or in other words the total number of possible values.
So, a large sensitive attribute domain size does not guarantee that
the number of possible values actually occuring is large. Instead,
a simple entropy measure such as the shannon’s entropy could be
used to measure the actual number of possible values. The entropy
value for each of these attributes is listed in Table 4. Although
the actual domain size for ‘Occupation” attribute is larger, its en-
tropy is less than that of than that of the “Industry” attribute. Now,
the conjecture is that as the entropy (or information content) of the
sensitive attribute increases, the severity of intersection attack in-
creases. Our result in Figure 7 confirms this. The average drop in
effective anonymity increases with the entropy of the correspond-
ing sensitive attribute domain since the non-sensitive attributes are
kept the same for all the datasets.
3.6 Number of Databases
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Figure 5: Severity of the intersection attack - l-diversity and t-closeness (a)(b) Adult Database (c)(d) IPUMS Database
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In the above experiments we have considered the scenario in
which two anonymized releases contain information about over-
lapping population. As data publishing becomes more prevelant
among organizations that would like to share data for research and
collaborative purposes, it is possible that the number of anonymized
releases available containing information about the same subset of
people is more than just two. The adversary could use as many
anonymized releases as possible to gather information about a tar-
get population and use the intersection attack to deduce the sen-
sitive attribute values. In such a scenario, it is interesting to see
how the intersection attack performs in the presence multiple (more
than 2) overlapping anonymized releases. We first consider the per-
centage of vulnerable population with a confidence level of 100%
(PV P100%). Figure 8(a) plots this for varying number (n = 2, 3, 4)
of anonymized releases available to adversary. Here again, we build
n overlapping subsets of the IPUMS database by fixing the over-
lapping population at 5000. It can be observed that the severity
of the intersection attack increases with the increase in the num-
ber of anonymized releases available to the adversary. There is a
significant increase in the percentage of vulnerable population with
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Figure 7: Effect of sensitive attribute domain size - IPUMS database.
the increase in n, for small values of k. However, there seem to
be no such significant increase for larger values of k. The reason
for this is that the partition sizes for larger values of k tend to be
large enough such that the presence of additional anonymized re-
leases does not help the intersection attack anymore. Alternative
to the severity of the attack, we can study the effect of the number
of anonymized releases on the drop in effective anonymity. Fig-
ure 8(b) plots the average drop in effective anonymity for varying
number (n = 2, 3, 4) of anonymized releases. Here again we can
observe that drop in effective anonymity increases with the increase
in the number of anonymized releases. These results indicate that
if the anonymized releases correspond to fairly larger values of k,
there is only limited information gained by the adversary by col-
lecting additional releases.
4. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section we give a precise formulation of “resistance to ar-
bitrary side information” and show that several relaxations of dif-
ferential privacy imply it. The formulation follows the ideas origi-
nally due to Dwork and McSherry, stated implicitly in [12]. This is,
to our knowledge, the first place such a formulation appears explic-
itly. The proof that relaxed definitions (and hence the schemes of
[13, 29, 25]) satisfy the Bayesian formulation is new. These results
are explained in a greater detail in a separate technical report [20].
In this paper we just reproduce the relevant parts from [20].
We represent databases as vectors in Dn for some domain D
(for example, in the case of the relational databases above, D is the
product of the attribute domains). There is no distinction between
“sensitive” and “insensitive” information. Given a randomized al-
gorithm A, we let A(D) be the random variable (or, probability
distribution on outputs) corresponding to input D.
DEFINITION 10 (DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY). A randomized al-
gorithm A is -differentially private if for all databases D1, D2
∈ Dn that differ in one individual, and for all subsets S of outputs,
Pr[A(D1) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[A(D2) ∈ S].
This definition states that changing a single individual’s data in
the database leads to a small change in the distribution on outputs.
Unlike more standard measures of distance such as total variation
(also called statistical difference) or Kullback-Leibler divergence,
the metric here is multiplicative and so even very unlikely events
must have approximately the same probability under the distribu-
tions A(D1) and A(D2). This condition was relaxed somewhat in
other papers [10, 15, 6, 13, 8, 29, 25]. The schemes in all those
papers, however, satisfy the following relaxation [13]:
DEFINITION 11. A randomized algorithm A is (, δ)-differ-
entially private if for all databases D1, D2 ∈ Dn that differ in
one individual, and for all subsets S of outputs, Pr[A(D1) ∈ S] ≤
e Pr[A(D2) ∈ S] + δ .
The relaxations used in [15, 6, 25] were in fact stronger (i.e., less
relaxed) than Definition 10. One consequence of the results below
is that all the definitions are equivalent up to polynomial changes
in the parameters, and so given the space constraints we work only
with the simplest notion.2
4.1 Semantics of Differential Privacy
There is a crisp, semantically-flavored interpretation of differen-
tial privacy, due to Dwork and McSherry, and explained in [12]:
Regardless of external knowledge, an adversary with access to the
sanitized database draws the same conclusions whether or not my
data is included in the original data. (the use of the term “seman-
tic” for such definitions dates back to semantic security of encryp-
tion [18]).
We require a mathematical formulation of “arbitrary external
knowledge”, and of “drawing conclusions”. The first is captured
via a prior probability distribution b on Dn (b is a mnemonic for
“beliefs”). Conclusions are modeled by the corresponding poste-
rior distribution: given a transcript t, the adversary updates his be-
lief about the database D using Bayes’ rule to obtain a posterior bb:
bb[D|t] def= Pr[A(D) = t]b[D]P
D′ Pr[A(D′) = t]b[D′]
. (1)
In an interactive scheme, the definition of A depends on the ad-
versary’s choices; for simplicity we omit the dependence on the
adversary in the notation. Also, for simplicity, we discuss only dis-
crete probability distributions. Our results extend directly to the
interactive, continuous case.
For a databaseD, defineD−i to be the vector obtained by replac-
ing position i by some default value in D (any value in D will do).
This corresponds to “removing” person i’s data. We consider n+1
related scenarios (“games”, in the language of cryptography), num-
bered 0 through n. In Game 0, the adversary interacts with A(D).
This is the interaction that takes place in the real world. In Game
i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n), the adversary interacts with A(D−i). Game
i describes the hypothetical scenario where person i’s data is not
included.
For a particular belief distribution b and transcript t, we consider
the n + 1 corresponding posterior distributions bb0, . . . ,bbn. The
posterior bb0 is the same as bb (defined in Eq. (1)). For larger i, the
i-th posterior distribution bbi represents the conclusions drawn in
Game i, that is
bbi[D|t] def= Pr[A(D−i) = t]b[D]P
D′ Pr[A(D′−i) = t]b[D′]
.
Given a particular transcript t, privacy has been breached if there
exists an index i such that the adversary would draw different con-
clusions depending on whether or not i’s data was used. It turns out
that the exact measure of “different” here does not matter much. We
chose the weakest notion that applies, namely statistical difference.
If P and Q are probability measures on the set X , the statistical
difference between P and Q is defined as:
SD (P,Q) = max
S⊂X
| P [S]−Q[S]|.
2That said, some of the other relaxations, such as probabilistic dif-
ferential privacy of [25], could lead to better parameters in Theo-
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Figure 8: Effect of Number of Anonymized Releases - IPUMS Database (a) Percentage of Vulnerable Poplation (b) Drop in Effective Anonymity
DEFINITION 12. An algorithm A is -semantically private if
for all prior distributions b on Dn, for all databases D ∈ Dn, for
all possible transcripts t, and for all i = 1, . . . , n,
SD
“bb0[D|t] , bbi[D|t] ” ≤ .
This can be relaxed to allow a probability δ of failure.
DEFINITION 13. An algorithm is (, δ)-semantically private
if, for all prior distributions b, with probability at least 1 − δ over
pairs (D, t), where the database D ← b (D is drawn according to
b) and the transcript t ← A(D) (t is drawn according to A(D)),
for all i = 1, . . . , n: SD
“bb0[D|t] , bbi[D|t]” ≤ .
Dwork and McSherry proposed the notion of semantic privacy,
informally, and observed that it is equivalent to differential privacy.
PROPOSITION 14 (DWORK-MCSHERRY). -differential pri-
vacy implies b-semantic privacy, where b = e − 1.
We show that this implication holds much more generally:
THEOREM 15 (MAIN RESULT). (, δ)-differential privacy im-
plies (′, δ′)-semantic privacy where ′ = e3 − 1 + 2√δ and
δ′ = O(n
√
δ).
Theorem 15 states that the relaxations notions of differential pri-
vacy used in some previous work still imply privacy in the face of
arbitrary side information. This is not the case for all possible re-
laxations, even very natural ones. For example, if one replaced the
multiplicative notion of distance used in differential privacy with
total variation distance, then the following “sanitizer” would be
deemed private: choose an index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} uniformly at ran-
dom and publish the entire record of individual i together with his
or her identity (example 2 in [14]). Such a “sanitizer” would not be
meaningful at all, regardless of side information.
Finally, the techniques used to prove Theorem 15 can also be
used to analyze schemes which do not provide privacy for all pairs
of neighboring databases D1 and D2, but rather only for most such
pairs (neighboring databases are the ones that differ in one indi-
vidual). Specifically, it is sufficient that those databases where the
“indistinguishability” condition fails occur with small probability.
DEFINITION 16 ((, δ)-INDISTINGUISHABILITY). Two rand-
om variables X,Y taking values in a set X are (, δ)-indistingui-
shable if for all sets S ⊆ X , Pr[X ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[Y ∈ S] + δ and
Pr[Y ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[X ∈ S] + δ .
THEOREM 17. Let A be a randomized algorithm. Let E =
{D1 ∈ Dn : ∀ neighbors D2 of D1, A(D1) and A(D2) are
(, δ)-indistinguishable} . Then A satisfies (′, δ′)-semantic pri-
vacy for any prior distribution b such that b[E ] = PrD3←b[D3 ∈
E ] ≥ 1− δ with ′ = e3 − 1 + 2√δ and δ′ = O(n√δ).
4.2 Proof Sketch for Main Results
The complete proofs are described in [20]. Here we sketch the
main ideas behind both the proofs. Let Y |X=a denote the condi-
tional distribution of Y given that X = a for jointly distributed
random variables X and Y . The following lemma (proof omitted)
plays an important role in our proofs.
LEMMA 18 (MAIN LEMMA). Suppose two pairs of random
variables (X,A(X)) and (Y,A′(Y )) are (, δ)-indistinguishable
(for some randomized algorithmsA andA′). Then with probability
at least 1−δ′′ over t← A(X) (equivalently t← A′(Y )), the ran-
dom variables X|A(X)=t and Y |A′(Y )=t are (ˆ, δˆ)-indistinguish-
able with ˆ = 3, δˆ = 2
√
δ, and δ′′ =
√
δ + 2δ
e
= O(
√
δ).
Let A be a randomized algorithm (in the setting of Theorem 15,
A is a (, δ)-differentially private algorithm). Let b be a belief dis-
tribution (in the setting of Proposition 17, b is a belief with b(E) ≥
1 − δ). The main idea behind both the proofs is to use Lemma 18
to show that with probability at least 1− O(√δ) over pairs (D, t)
where D ← b and t ← A(D), SD `b|A(D)=t, b|A(D−i)=t´ ≤ ′.
Taking a union bound over all coordinates i, implies that with prob-
ability at least 1−O(n√δ) over pairs (D, t)whereD ← b and t←
A(D), for all i = 1, . . . , n, we have SD `b|A(D)=t, b|A(D−i)=t´
≤ ′. For Proposition 17, it shows thatA satisfies (′, δ′)-semantic
privacy for b. In the Theorem 15 setting whereA is (, δ)-different-
ially private and b is arbitrary, it shows that (, δ)-differential pri-
vacy implies (′, δ′)-semantic privacy.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we explored how one can reason about privacy
in the presence of independent anonymized releases of overlap-
ping population. Our experimental study indicates that several cur-
rently proposed partition-based anonymization schemes, including
k-anonymity and its variants, are vulnerable to composition attacks.
On the positive side, we gave a precise formulation of the property
“resistance to arbitrary side information” and show that several re-
laxations of differential privacy satisfy it.
The most striking question that arises from this work is whether
randomness in the anonymization algorithm is necessary to resist
complex side information such as independent releases. Another
interesting direction would be to study other settings where com-
position attacks are realistic and effective? A natural candidate for
future investigation are the releases of overlapping contingency ta-
bles that are often considered in the statistical literature.
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